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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2446 
 ___________ 
 
 JOSE RODAS-LEON, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A097-523-887) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: April 12, 2012) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jose Rodas-Leon petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) May 6, 2011 order.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition for 
review. 
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I 
 Rodas-Leon is a citizen of Ecuador.  He was placed in removal proceedings in 
2005.  Rodas-Leon conceded removability on the basis of being present without 
inspection, but sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal and voluntary 
departure.  The IJ granted his request for cancellation, but did not adjudicate the 
voluntary departure request, and the Department of Homeland Security appealed.  On 
appeal, the BIA reversed the IJ’s grant of cancellation of removal, reasoning that Rodas-
Leon had failed to demonstrate his eligibility for that relief.  Specifically, the BIA 
reasoned that Rodas-Leon failed to show that two of his prior convictions were not 
crimes of moral turpitude and that, in the alternative, Rodas-Leon had not shown that his 
four children, who are United States citizens, would suffer exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship if he is removed.  Accordingly, the BIA sustained the appeal and 
remanded the matter to the IJ “for the sole purpose of considering [Rodas-Leon’s] 
eligibility for voluntary departure or in the alternative, to enter a final order of removal.”  
Rodas-Leon now petitions for review of that decision.1
II 
 
 At the outset, we must address whether, in light of the BIA’s order remanding 
Rodas-Leon’s case to the IJ, there exists a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction 
                                                 
1  It is unclear from the record whether, on remand, the IJ granted Rodas-Leon’s 
request for voluntary departure. 
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over the petition for review.2  Our jurisdiction in immigration proceedings is limited to 
the review of final orders of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a); Mulanga v. Ashcroft
 An “order is final for jurisdictional purposes when a removability determination 
has been made that is no longer appealable to the BIA, regardless whether a formal order 
of removal has been entered . . . .”  
, 349 
F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 2003).  Given that the BIA overturned the IJ’s grant of 
cancellation of removal, but remanded the matter for consideration of Rodas-Leon’s 
application for voluntary departure, the question arises whether the BIA’s order is “final” 
within the meaning of § 1252(a).  We conclude that it is. 
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 
2008); accord Castrejon-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 1359, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a BIA order reversing an IJ’s decision to grant suspension of removal and remanding 
“for a determination of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation” was a final order of 
removal, as nothing was pending before the BIA and “the petitioner had no reason or 
basis for appealing the [IJ’s] decision in his favor”).  As in Castrejon-Garcia, no aspect of 
the removability determination remains pending before or appealable to the BIA.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA’s order is appealable for purposes of § 1252(a).3
                                                 
2  In an order entered July 18, 2011, we directed the parties to address in their briefs 
whether the BIA’s May 6, 2011 order constitutes a final order of removal over which 
we may exercise jurisdiction.  Inexplicably, neither Rodas-Leon, who is represented 
by counsel, nor counsel for the Respondent saw fit to address that specific question in 
their briefs. 
 
 
3  In similar circumstances, other courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion, 
but have declined to exercise jurisdiction for prudential reasons in light of 8 C.F.R. 
4 
 
 However, we must dismiss the petition for review for another reason.  If the BIA 
provides two alternative grounds for denying relief, and we lack jurisdiction to review 
one, then we lack jurisdiction over the whole case.  See Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 
830 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Ekasinta v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005)).  
Here, the BIA concluded (1) that Rodas-Leon failed to demonstrate that his prior 
convictions were not for crimes of moral turpitude, a legal question over which we have 
jurisdiction, see Jeune v. Att’y Gen.
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 1240.26, which governs voluntary departure.  See Qingyun Li v. Holder, 666 F.3d 
147, 149-53 (4th Cir. 2011); Giraldo v. Holder, 654 F.3d 609, 616-18 (6th Cir. 2011); 
see also Hakim v. Holder, 611 F.3d 73, 78-79 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) (assuming the 
existence of a final order of removal arguendo, and citing five other cases for the 
proposition that jurisdiction existed, but declining to exercise jurisdiction).  Section 
1240.26(i) automatically terminates a grant of voluntary departure if an alien files a 
petition for review.  The Li, Giraldo, and Hakim Courts noted that § 1240.26 
contemplates a chronological order -- i.e., that the grant of voluntary departure 
precedes the filing of a petition for review-- and agreed that exercising jurisdiction 
over a petition for review in a case where a voluntary departure determination had not 
yet been made would permit an alien “to circumvent the regulation by allowing him to 
seek both voluntary departure and judicial review, thus hindering judicial economy 
and denying the government the benefit of ‘a prompt and costless departure.’”  
Hakim, 611 F.3d at 79 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 20 (2009)).  We need 
not consider whether prudential concerns warrant a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in 
this case, however, because even assuming it would be appropriate to exercise 
jurisdiction under § 1252(a), another provision requires us to dismiss the petition for 
review. 
, 476 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007), and (2) that, even 
if Rodas-Leon’s convictions were not for crimes involving moral turpitude, he had not 
demonstrated that his removal would result in an exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to his United States citizen children -- a discretionary determination that we lack 
jurisdiction to review unless Rodas-Leon raises a colorable legal or constitutional claim 
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that the BIA erred in making that determination.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), (D); 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft
 In his petition for review, Rodas-Leon argues that the BIA failed to evaluate in the 
aggregate the factors indicating a hardship to his children, as required by BIA precedent, 
, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 
2003).   
see Matter of Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 472 (BIA 2002), and that the BIA 
applied the wrong legal standard, as evidenced by its failure to cite Recinas in its opinion.  
We disagree.  The BIA cited both Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 
2001), and Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002), which, like 
Recinas, set forth the considerations the BIA must make when evaluating a claim of 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and which both expressly consider such 
factors in the aggregate.  See Andazola, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 324 (“[E]ven considering the 
potential hardship caused by the respondent’s status as an unmarried mother, together 
with the other hardships described above . . .”); Monreal, 23 I. &. N. Dec. at 65 (“Even 
considering all of the factors presented cumulatively . . .”).  At base, then, Rodas-Leon’s 
argument amounts to a challenge to the BIA’s discretionary determination.  See Patel v. 
Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although Patel claims to be challenging 
the IJ’s misapplication of a legal standard, she is actually asserting that she met her 
burden of showing an exceptional hardship.  We do not have jurisdiction to review this 
claim because it challenges a discretionary determination and does not present a 
constitutional question or a question of law.”).  Because Rodas-Leon has advanced no 
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colorable legal arguments challenging the BIA’s analysis, its determination that Rodas-
Leon did not demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship must be left 
undisturbed, as it is beyond our jurisdiction.  See id.
 In sum, because we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary 
determination that Rodas-Leon failed to demonstrate an exceptional and extremely 
unusual hardship to his children if he is removed, we cannot reach Rodas-Leon’s 
challenge to the BIA’s alternative holding that he did not show that his prior convictions 
were not for crimes of moral turpitude.  
   
See Joseph
 
, 579 F.3d at 830.  Accordingly, we 
will dismiss the petition for review. 
